In these post-positivist times, the slogan "science is value free" is frequently rejected disdainfully as a vestige of a bygone age. But, as often happens with babies and their bathwater, there may be something worthwhile in this slogan that we should try to identify and retain. To this end, I'll begin with two absurdities:
Scientific inference is independent of values.
I don't know if any philosopher ever believed either of these propositions. Proposition (1) is false for the simple reason that scientists are people, just like the rest of us. Perhaps they often strive to leave their ethical and political values at the laboratory door, but who ever thought that all of them have this aim, and that those who do succeed 100% of the time? This, by the way, does not mean that we get to assume that scientific activity can be explained solely in terms of the ethical and political values that scientists have. Rather, recognizing the absurdity of (1) should lead us to approach such psychological and sociological questions on a case-by-case basis. Scientists may vary among themselves, and a single scientist may be more influenced by these values in some contexts than in others. Maybe some scientific work proceeds completely independently of these values while other parts of science are entirely driven by them; and perhaps a good deal of the real world falls somewhere in between these two extremes.
Proposition (2) is absurd because scientific inference is regulated by normative rules.
Scientists try to construct good tests of their hypotheses, they judge some explanations good and others bad, and they say that some inferences are flawed or weak while others are strong. The 2 words I have italicized indicate that scientists are immersed in tasks of evaluation. They impose their norms on the ideational entities they construct. However, the obvious falsehood of (2) leaves it open that a restricted version of that proposition might be on the right track:
The fact that believing a proposition would have good or bad ethical or political consequences is not evidence for or against that proposition's being true.
Is this proposition, or some refinement of it, the kernel of truth in the frequently misstated idea that "science is value free?"
We should not accept proposition (3) just because it "sounds right." After all, the evidence relation often connects facts that seem at first glance to be utterly unrelated. The proposition that the dinosaurs went extinct 65 million years ago because of a meteor hit and the proposition that there now is an iridium layer in certain rocks may appear to have nothing to do with each other. How could the presence of iridium in present day rocks bear on the question of why the dinosaurs went extinct so long ago? Well, appearances to the contrary, there may well be such a connection (Alvarez and Asaro 1990) . Why, then, should we be so sure that the ethical consequences of believing a proposition have no bearing on whether the proposition is true?
This is a good question, and in the absence of a good answer, we should not complacently assume that (3) If (3) is true, so is (4). But surely there are counterexamples to proposition (4). Consider a physician who will give a drug to her patients if she thinks the drug is safe, but will withhold the drug if she thinks it is not. Suppose that the drug will provide significant health benefits if it is safe. And suppose further that the physician is a pretty good judge of whether the drug is safe.
We then have a causal chain in which earlier links raise the probability of later ones:
the drug is safe  the doctor thinks the drug is safe  the patients receive the drug  good consequences accrue to the patients In this instance, correlation is transitive. The non-ethical statement "the drug is safe" is therefore evidence for the ethical statement "good consequences accrue to the patients." An ethical and a nonethical fact are evidentially related, just like smoke and fire. I conclude that (4), and therefore (3), are false (Stephens 2000) .
It might be replied that (3) and (4) can be saved from refutation by focusing exclusively on the two propositions under discussion. Consider just the two statements "the drug is safe" and "good consequences accrue to the patients." In the absence of any further information, there is no saying whether these statements are positively evidentially relevant to each other, or 4 negatively relevant, or entirely irrelevant. We assumed in our story that the physician is wellmeaning and discerning. This assumption was enough to bring the two statements into a positive relation. However, if the doctor were malevolent, or a very bad judge of drug safety, the two statements would stand in a relation of negative relevance or be mutually irrelevant. With no further information, the relation of the two statements is indeterminate. This is a probabilistic analog of Duhem's thesis (Sober 1988 ).
The trouble with this reply is that what is true for the pair of statements about the physician is true for practically any pair of statements. 1 This is because the evidence relation isn't binary; it has at least three places. When one statement is evidence for a second, this usually is due to the mediation of a third, which provides background information. 2 Given this, it is hardly surprising that ethical facts can provide evidence about scientific propositions; they are able to do this if one's background assumptions include other, ethical, claims.
How is this criticism of (3) and (4) related to Hume's famous dictum that an ought cannot be inferred from an is? Although Hume was talking about deduction, it is natural to generalize his thesis to a claim about evidential relationships that are nondeductive and probabilistic. What one needs to say here is that an is-statement and an ought-statement are not evidentially relevant to each other, unless one's background assumptions include other ought-statements. But since one's background assumptions often do include such "bridge principles," evidential reasoning can run from is to ought and from ought to is. theological conviction. But let's restrict our attention to people who fill James' bill. These people would benefit from believing that God exists; I'll go further and say that it is a good thing for these people to embrace theism and thus save themselves from the slough of despond.
However, I still want to claim that the fact that they would benefit from believing in God provides no evidence that God in fact exists. It is examples like this that make proposition (3) sound so plausible. What distinguishes James' theist from the well-meaning physician?
We can separate these cases by considering the following 2-by-2 table; the entry in a cell represents utility --how good or bad the consequences are of being in that situation. In the physician case (where P = "the drug is safe"), there are both "vertical" and "horizontal" effects.
The well-being of the patients is affected both by whether the drug is safe (w>x) 4 and by what the physician believes (w>y and z>x). In the case of James' believer (where P = "God exists"), however, there are only vertical effects. As far as the individual's psychological well-being is concerned, the only thing that matters is that he or she believes in God (w>y and x>z); whether God actually exists doesn't matter (w=x and y=z).
 P is true P is false S believes P w x S does not believe P y z This, I think, provides the key to revising propositions (3) and (4). Our question -when do the ethical consequences of believing a proposition provide evidence as to whether the proposition is true? -can be represented by using the tools of decision theory. We begin by identifying the expected value of each of the two "acts:" Here "p" denotes the probability that the proposition P is true (and I assume that acts are independent of states of the world Suppose that the left-hand inequality is true. When will filling in the values for the utilities w, x, y, and z provide a nontrivial lower-or upper-bound on the value of p? This fails to happen in the case of James' theist because (w-y) is positive while (z-x) is negative. With these values, all that follows is that p/(1-p) must be greater than some negative number; this is entirely uninformative, since no ratio of probabilities can be negative. The case of the physician is different. Here (z-x) and (w-y) are both positive; this means that their ratio provides a nontrivial lower-bound for the value of p. 6 Thus, science and ethics are not always as separate as propositions (3) and (4) suggest --sometimes information about the ethical consequences of believing a proposition does provide information about the probability that the proposition is true. There is a special circumstance in which it is possible to decide which of the two actions (believe P, or don't) is better without any information about the probability that P is true. This is the case in which one action dominates the other. James' argument is of this type --he contends that belief in God is beneficial, whether or not God in fact exists. 8 However, we have already seen that the inequality of the expected utilities provides no information about the probabilities in James' case. Without dominance, no conclusion about which action is better can be reached unless one already has information about the probabilities. What we have here is an instance of the maxim out of nothing, nothing comes. If comparing the ethical consequences of believing P and of not believing P has implications about the probability of P, this must be because the description of the ethical consequences already has built into it some information about those probabilities. Thus, ethical facts (about expected utilities) and scientific facts (about probabilities) are connected, contrary to what (3) and (4) assert. However, the problem is that this connection is useless; we can't use ethical information to gain information we don't already have about probabilities.
The situation would be different if we were able to discover which actions are better than which others, when dominance fails, without already having to have information about probabilities. For example, if there were an infallible guru who would simply tell us what to do, and who would reveal the utilities that go with different states of the world, we could use these inputs to obtain new information about probabilities. But in the absence of such an authority, we are left with the conclusion that our access to information about what we should do must be based on information about probabilities (except when there is dominance). When an ethical conclusion requires information about probabilities (as in the case of the physician), that conclusion can't be a source of new information about those probabilities. And when the ethical conclusion can be reached without information about probabilities (as in the case that James describes), the conclusion tells us nothing about the probabilities. This suggests the following dilemma argument:
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The question of whether believing P has better ethical consequences than not believing P either depends for its answer on information about the probability of P, or it does not.
If it does so depend, then we need information about probabilities to answer the ethical question, and so the ethical judgment cannot supply information about probabilities that we don't already have.
If it does not so depend, then the ethical judgment has no implications about the probability of P.
________________________________________________________ (5)
Judgments about the ethical consequences of believing P cannot supply new information about the probability of P.
The conclusion of this argument, proposition (5), is a reasonable successor of the failed propositions (3) and (4).
The argument just presented is reminiscent of Rudner's (1953) well-known argument that the scientist qua scientist makes value judgments. 9 Rudner describes a physician who must decide whether a drug is safe and argues that this decision must be based on considering ethical features of the four possible outcomes depicted in the two-by-two table we have already discussed. Rudner's argument elicited two criticisms. Levi (1967) contended that accepting a proposition and acting on one's belief are distinct, and that the former should not be based on ethical values; Jeffrey (1956) maintained that science is not in the business of accepting and rejecting, but merely seeks to assign probabilities to hypotheses. My own argument is neutral on but not in the case of James' theist.
In the example about the physician, and in many other examples of moral deliberation about which action to perform, one's ethical decision depends on matters of scientific fact. In terms of our 2-by-2 table, the ubiquitous pattern is that an inequality gets reversed as one moves from the first column to the second. Although one's ethical decision thus depends on a judgment about a matter of scientific fact, it is possible to form a judgment about the scientific facts without having a commitment, one way or the other, on the ethical question. The physician can't decide whether to administer the drug without knowing something about its probability of being safe, but it is perfectly possible to discover whether a drug is safe without having a view, one way or the other, on whether unsafe drugs should be withheld from patients. Moral ignoramuses can assess the weight of evidence, but scientific ignoramuses cannot make good moral decisions (when those decisions depend, as they almost always do, on scientific matters of fact).
Let's review our progress from propositions (1) and (2) through (3) and (4) and then to (5). Proposition (1) concerns the behavior of scientists, whereas (3) and (4) concern the logic of various scientific concepts. Proposition (2) Harman (1977) and Ruse and Wilson (1986) each present parsimony arguments for the nonexistence of ethical facts; see Sober (2005) and (1994b), respectively, for discussion of each.
4. I take it that it doesn't matter whether the drug is safe if the doctor doesn't believe that it is (y=z), since patients won't receive the drug in that situation regardless of whether the drug would be good for them.
5. It might be suggested that believing a proposition is not an action, in the sense that it is not subject to the will. This point is sometimes used against Pascal's wager, but it is an objection that Pascal successfully addressed -he says that if absorbing his argument does not instantly trigger belief, one should go live among religious people so that habits of belief will gradually take hold. Believing a proposition is like other "nonbasic actions" -being President of the US isn't something one can directly bring about by an act of will, but this does not place it outside the domain of decision theory. For further discussion, see Mougin and Sober (1994) .
6.Symmetrically, if not believing P were the better action, this would impose a nontrivial upperbound on the value of the probability.
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7. Decision theory from early on has taken an interest in describing the interrelationships of expected utility, utility, and probability. For a brief introduction, see Skyrms (2000, pp. 138-143) .
8. Pascal's wager, when the payoffs are finite, does not have this property. One needs some information about the probability of God's existing to reach a decision about whether believing is better than not believing. In fact the theist contemplating Pascal's wager (with finite payoffs) is in the same qualitative situation as the physician deciding whether to believe that the drug is safe.
See Mougin and Sober (1994) discussion.
9. The problem that Rudner addresses is the one that James (1897) and W.K. Clifford (1879) debated. It also was central to the debate between the "left" and "right" wings of the Vienna Circle. Neurath argued that evidence does not determine theory choice, and that ethical and political values can and should be used to close the gap; Schlick, Carnap, and Reichenbach countered that the intrusion of such values into theory choice is both undesirable and unnecessary -it would compromise the objectivity of science, and scientific inferences can be drawn without taking such values into account. See Howard (2002) for discussion.
